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Cryptanalysis and Improvement of an Efficient
Certificateless Signature Scheme
Jiguo Li, Xinyi Huang, Yi Mu, and Wei Wu
Abstract: In traditional digital signature schemes, certificates
signed by a trusted party are required to ensure the authenticity
of the public key. In Asiacrypt 2003, the concept of certificateless
signature scheme was introduced. The advantage of certificate-
less public key cryptography successfully eliminates the necessity of
certificates in the traditional public key cryptography and simulta-
neously solves the inherent key escrow problem suffered in identity-
based cryptography. Recently, Yap et al. proposed an efficient cer-
tificateless signature scheme and claimed that their scheme is exis-
tentially unforgeable in the random oracle model. In this paper, we
show that the certificateless signature scheme proposed by Yap et
al. is insecure against public key replacement attacks. Further-
more, we propose an improved certificateless signature scheme,
which is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message
attacks under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in the
random oracle model and provide the security proof of the pro-
posed scheme.
Index Terms: Certificateless cryptography, certificateless signature,
public key replacement attack, security analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
In traditional digital signature schemes, certificates that are
signed by a trusted third party are used to ‘bind’ the user’s iden-
tity and his public key. In [1], Shamir introduced a new notion
called identity-based cryptography where the user’s public key
is indeed his identity (such as an email address, an IP address,
etc.). This way, the need of certification can be avoided. In
identity-based cryptography, the user’s secret key is generated
by Key Generation Center (KGC). Therefore, there is an inher-
ent key escrow problem in such a cryptosystem.
To fill the gap between traditional cryptography and identity-
based cryptography, Al-Riyami and Paterson proposed a new
paradigm called certificateless cryptography in [2]. In a certifi-
cateless cryptosystem, KGC is involved to issue a partial key for
user. The user also independently generates an additional pub-
lic/secret key pair and performs some cryptographic operations
in such a way that they can only be carried out when both the
user’s partial key and the user’s secret key are known. Know-
ing one of them should not be able to impersonate the user and
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carry out any of the cryptographic operations as the user. There-
fore, certificateless cryptography not only solves the key escrow
problem that is inherent in identity-based cryptography, but also
eliminates the use of certificates as in traditional digital signa-
ture schemes, which are generally considered to be costly to use
and manage.
Due to the lack of public key authentication, it is important
to assume that an adversary can replace the user’s public key
by a false key of its choice [2]. In order to provide a secure
certificateless signature scheme, this type of attacks must not
be able to produce signatures that pass verification with the re-
placed public key [2]. An assumption that must be made is that
the KGC does not mount a public key replacement attack since
he possesses the master-key and can generate all user’s partial
private keys. It is reasonable that we suppose KGC is trusted
not to replace public keys. This way, the level of trust is simi-
lar to the trust in a CA in a traditional PKI. We will review the
adversarial model defined in [2], [3] in the next section.
Many certificateless public key encryption schemes [2], [4]–
[7] and certificateless signature schemes (CLS) [2], [3], [8]–[11]
have been proposed since certificateless public key cryptogra-
phy was introduced. The first CLS scheme was proposed by
Al-Riyami and Paterson in [2] but there is no security proof
provided. Besides, their CLS scheme has been proven inse-
cure in their defined model by Huang et al.[11]. They showed
that an adversary can successfully forge a certificateless signa-
ture by replacing the public key of the signer and proposed a
new scheme, which resists against the above attack. Recently,
Huang et al. [17] revisited the security models of certificate-
less signatures and proposed two new constructions which are
provably secure in the random oracle model. Yum and Lee [8]
proposed a generic construction of CLS based on an identity-
based signature scheme and a traditional public key signature
scheme, which is a different approach in constructing CLS. The
merit of the above approach is that the resulting CLS scheme
can achieve the same trust level as that of a traditional signature
scheme. Hu et al. [12] showed that their generic construction
was insecure against public key replacement attack. In particu-
lar, they showed that the security requirements of their generic
building blocks are insufficient to support some security claims
stated in [8]. Hu et al. also proposed a modification of their
scheme and showed its security in a new and simplified security
model. Wang et al. proposed a certificateless threshold signa-
ture scheme [10] based on bilinear pairings. Their scheme is ro-
bust and existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen mes-
sage attacks under computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in
the random oracle model. Zhang et al. [3] presented a security
model for certificateless public-key signature schemes, and pro-
posed an efficient construction based on bilinear pairings. Re-
cently, Yap et al. proposed an efficient certificateless signature
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scheme [9]. In Yap’s scheme, by using a shorter public key,
there are only two pairing computations in the verification algo-
rithm. Besides, no pairing computation is needed in the signing
algorithm. Hence, their scheme is more efficient than the exist-
ing certificateless signature scheme. However, as we will show
in this paper, the certificateless signature scheme proposed by
Yap et al. is insecure against public key replacement attack.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we show that the scheme proposed by Yap et al.
does not resist against public key replacement attacks, and gives
the main cause suffered from attack. More precisely, we show
that an attacker who does not possess the master-key but can
only do a public key replacement attack, can always success-
fully forge a signature. In addition, the message of the forgery
can be chosen arbitrarily by the adversary. The main difference
compared with a common public key replacement attack used
in the other certificateless signature scheme [11], [12] is that the
adversary can obtain the user’s full private key defined in their
scheme [9] when he/she replaces the public key of this user. Fur-
thermore, we propose a provably secure efficient certificateless
signature scheme, which is existentially unforgeable in the ran-
dom oracle model under adaptive chosen message attacks and
proves the security of the proposed scheme in Zhang’s security
model [3]. Compared with Yap’s security proof, our proof can
be obtained without the requirement that AI should have sub-
mitted the secret information sID corresponding to the replaced
public-key PKID when querying the signing oracle and making
forgery.
Organization of the Paper
In the next section, we will review some preliminaries re-
quired throughout the paper. We review an efficient certificate-
less signature scheme [9] in Section III. In Section IV, we will
show the above scheme fails to resist against the public key re-
placement attack. We propose an efficient certificateless signa-
ture scheme in Section V. In Section VI, we prove the security
of the proposed scheme in Zhang’s security model [3]. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will review some fundamental back-
grounds required in this paper, namely bilinear pairing, the defi-
nition and security model of the certificateless signature scheme.
A. Bilinear Pairing
Let G1 denote an additive group of prime order q and G2 be a
multiplicative group of the same order. Let P denote a generator
in G1. Let e : G1 × G1 → G2 be a bilinear mapping with the
following properties:
• The map e is bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab for all
P,Q ∈ G1, a, b ∈ ZZq .
• The map e is non-degenerate: e(P, P ) = 1G2 .
• The map e is efficiently computable.
Definition 1: (Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) prob-
lem in G1) Given (P, aP, bP ), for some a, b ∈ ZZ∗q , compute
abP .
The success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time
algorithm A in solving CDH problem in G1 is defined to be
SuccCDHA,G1 = Pr[A(P, aP, bP ) = abP : a, b ∈ ZZ∗q ].
The CDH assumption states that for every probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithmA, SuccCDHA,G1 is negligible.
B. Certificateless Signature Schemes
A certificateless signature scheme is defined by seven algo-
rithms (see literature [2]): Setup, Partial-Private-Key-Extract,
Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, Set-Public-Key, CL-
Sign, and CL-Verify. The description of each algorithm is as
follows.
• Setup: The master key and parameter generation algorithm
is a probabilistic algorithm that accepts as input a security
parameter 1k and returns a master-key and a parameter list
params.
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract: The partial private key is-
suance algorithm is a deterministic algorithm that accepts
as input a user identity ID, a parameter list param and a
master-key to produce the user’s partial private key DID.
• Set-Secret-Value: The set secret value setup algorithm is a
probabilistic algorithm that accepts as input a parameter list
param and a user identity ID to produce the user’s secret
value sID.
• Set-Private-Key: The set private key setup algorithm is a
probabilistic algorithm that accepts as input a parameter list
param, the user’s partial private key DID and the user’s
secret value sID to produce a private signing key SKID.
• Set-Public-Key: The public key generation algorithm is a
deterministic algorithm that takes as input a parameter list
param, a user identity ID and the user’s secret value sID to
produce a public key PKID.
• CL-Sign: The signing algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm
that accepts a message M ∈ M, M is the message space,
a user’s identity ID, a parameter list param and the user’s
signing key SKID to produce a signature σ.
• CL-Verify: The verification algorithm is a deterministic al-
gorithm that accepts a message M , a signature σ, a parame-
ter list param, the public key PKID and the user’s identity
ID to output true if the signature is correct, otherwise out-
puts ⊥.
C. Adversarial Model of Certificateless Signature Schemes
As defined in [2], there are two types of adversary with dif-
ferent capabilities:
Type I Adversary: This type of adversary AI does not have
access to the master-key, but AI has the ability to replace the
public key of any entity with a value of his choice, because there
is no certificate involved in certificateless signature schemes.
Type II Adversary: This type of adversary AII has access to
the master-key but cannot perform public keys replacement.
Nevertheless, no formal security model was presented in [2].
Huang et al. [11] and Zhang et al. [3] provided a formal defi-
nition of existential unforgeability of a certificateless signature
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scheme under both two types of chosen message attack, respec-
tively. In this section, we review the security model proposed
by Zhang et al. [3], which are defined using the following two
games between an adversaryA ∈ {AI ,AII} and a challenger.
Game-I: This is the game in which AI interacts with the chal-
lenger:
• Phase I-1: The challenger runs Setup(1k) for generat-
ing master-key and params. The challenger then gives
params to AI while keeping master-key secret.
• Phase I-2: AI performs the following oracle-query opera-
tions:
- Extract Partial Private Key: Each of which is denoted
by (ID, “partial key extract”). On receiving such a query,
the challenger computes DID = Partial-Private-Key-
Extract(params, master-key, ID) and returns it toAI .
- Extract Private Key: Each of which is denoted by (ID,
“private key extract”). Upon receiving such a query, the
challenger first computes DID = Partial-Private-Key-
Extract(params, master-key, ID) and then sID =
Set-Secret-Value (params, ID) as well as SKID =
Set-Private-Key (params, DID, sID). It returns SKID
to AI .
- Request Public Key: Each of which is denoted by
(ID, “public key request”). Upon receiving such a
query, the challenger computes DID = Partial-Private-
Key-Extract(params, master-key, ID), and sID =
Set-Secret-Value (params, ID). It then computes
PKID = Set-Public-Key (params, sID) and returns
it to AI .
Replace Public Key: AI may replace a public key
PKID with a value chosen by him. It is not required
for AI to provide the corresponding secret value when
making this query.
- Signing Queries: Each of which is of the form (ID,M ,
“signature”). On receiving such a query, the chal-
lenger finds SKID from its “query-answer” list, com-
putes σ =CL-Sign(params, M, ID, SKID), and re-
turns it to AI . If the public key PKID has been re-
placed byAI , then the challenger cannot find SKID and
thus the signing oracle’s answer may be incorrect. In
such case, we assume that AI may additionally submit
the secret information sID corresponding to the replaced
public-key PKID to the signing oracle.
• Phase I-3: Finally,AI outputs a message M∗, and a signa-
ture σ∗ corresponding to a target identity ID∗ and a public
key PKID∗ . Note that ID∗ cannot be an identity for which
the private key has been extracted. Also, ID∗ cannot be
an identity for which both the public key has been replaced
and the partial private key has been extracted. Moreover,
M∗ should not be queried to the signing oracle with respect
to ID∗ and PKID∗ . However, in case the PKID∗ is differ-
ent from the original public key of the entity with identity
ID∗, AI does not need to provide the corresponding secret
value to the challenger if it has not made signing queries for
the identity ID∗ and public key PKID∗ .
Game II: This is a game in which AII interacts with the chal-
lenger.
• Phase II-1: The challenger runs Setup(·) to generate
master-key and params. The challenger gives both
params and master-key to AII .
• Phase II-2: AII performs the following operations:
- Compute partial private key associated with ID: AII
computes DID = Partial-Private-Key-Extract(params,
master-key, ID). This can be done by AII since it
holds the master key.
- Make private key extraction queries: On receiving such a
query, the challenger computes DID = Partial-Private-
Key-Extract(params, master-key, ID), sID = Set-
Secret-Value (params, ID), and SKID =Set-Private-
Key(params, DID, sID). It then returns SKID to AII .
Make public key request queries: On receiving such
a query, the challenger sets DID = Partial-Private-
Key-Extract(params, master-key, ID), sID = Set-
Secret-Value (params, ID), and then computes
PKID = Set-Public-Key(params, sID, ID). It returns
PKID to AII .
Make signing queries: On receiving such a query, the
challenger finds SKID from its “query-answer” list,
computes σ = CL-Sign (params,M, ID, SKID), and
returns it to AII
• Phase II-3: AII outputs a message M∗, and a signature
σ∗ corresponding to a target identity ID∗ and a public key
PKID∗ . Note that ID∗ has not been issued as a private key
query. Moreover, M∗ should not be queried to the signing
oracle with respect to ID∗ and PKID∗ .
Definition 2: A certificateless signature scheme is existen-
tially unforgeable against chosen-message attacks if for any
probabilistic polynomial time adversary A (AI or AII ) suc-
ceeds in the above games (Game I or Game II)(i.e., CL-
Verify(params,PKID∗ ,M∗, ID∗, σ∗) = 1) is negligible. In
other words,
SuccEF−CLS−CMAA (k) ≤ 
where k is the system’s security parameter.
III. REVIEW OF AN EFFICIENT CERTIFICATELESS
SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this secion, we review an efficient certificateless signature
Scheme [9] proposed by Yap et al. The scheme is as follows:
1. Setup: Given a security parameter k, the algorithm works
as follows:
(a) Let (G1,G2) be groups with prime order q. e denotes the
bilinear pairing G1 ×G1 → G2.
(b) Choose an arbitrary generator of P ∈ G1.
(c) Select a random s ∈ ZZ∗q and set P0 = sP .
(d) Choose a cryptographic hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
G1 and H2 : {0, 1}∗ ×G1 → ZZ∗q .
The system parameters are params =< G1,G2, e, q, P, P0,
H1, H2 >. The message space and master-key are M =
{0, 1}∗ and s ∈ ZZ∗q , respectively.
2. Set-Partial-Private-Key: Given params and master-key,
this algorithm works as follows:
Computes QA = H1(IDA) ∈ G1 and outputs a partial pri-
vate key DA = sQA ∈ G1.
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3. Set-Secret-Key: Given params, select a random value
xA ∈ ZZ∗q , where xA is the secret value.
4. Set-Private-Key: Set private key SA = (xAQA + DA).
5. Set-Public-Key: Given params and the secret value xA,
this algorithm computes PA = xAP ∈ G1.
6. Sign: Given params, IDA, message m and private key SA,
the algorithm works as follows:
(a) Compute QA = H1(IDA) ∈ G1.
(b) Select a random value r ∈ ZZ∗q and set U = rQA ∈ G1.
(c) Set h = H2(m||U) ∈ ZZ∗q .
(d) Compute V = (r + h)SA.
(e) Set σ = (U, V ) as the signature of m.
7. Verify: Given signature σ, IDA,m, PA, this algorithm
works as follows:
(a) Compute QA = H1(IDA) ∈ G1.
(b) Compute h = H2(m||U) ∈ ZZ∗q .
(c) Check whether < P,P0 + PA, U + hQA, V > is a
valid Diffie-Hellman tuple, i.e., by verifying whether
e(P, V ) = e(P0 + PA, U + hQA). If not, then reject
the signature else accept it.
In a CLS, Setup and Setup-Partial-Private-Key are per-
formed by a KGC. A partial private key DA is given to a user A
by the KGC through a secure channel.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF YAP ET AL.’S
CERTIFICATELESS SIGNATURE SCHEME
Yap et al. claimed that their scheme is provably secure in
the random oracle model [13] under the CDH assumption. Par-
allelled with the work of [18], as we will show in this section,
their certificateless signature scheme does not resist against type
I adversary as defined in [2]. By replacing the public key PA of
the user A, a type I adversary AI can corrupt this user’s pri-
vate key SA, and therefore, can output a forged signature on any
message. The attack method is as follows:
1. Public-Key-Replacement: Firstly, AI chooses a random
r ∈ ZZ∗q , then he/she replaces the target user’s public key as
PA = rP − P0.
2. Private-Key-Corruption: Secondly,AI computes the target
user’s private key SA = rQA. SA is the valid private key
since
SA = xAQA + DA = (r − s)QA + sQA = rQA.
3. Signature-Forgery: Finally, for a message m, AI uses SA
to compute signature (U, V ) by the same way as the Sign
algorithm defined in Section III. Evidently (U, V ) is a valid
signature.
Remarks: In the common public key replacement attack, the ad-
versary only replaces target user’s public key and doesn’t get
corresponding private key. Our attack method can not only re-
place target user’s public key but also obtain the full private key
corresponding to modified public key of the user. Hence, anyone
can forge a valid certificateless signature. The main cause that
Yap et al.’s scheme does not resist against public key replace-
ment attack if their key generation is not proper. In Yap et al.’s
scheme [9], Adversary chooses a random r′ ∈ ZZ∗q and replaces
public key as P ′A = r
′P − P0, which means corresponding se-
cret key is x′A = r
′−s. Though the adversary does not know the
master-key of the KGC, he/she can eliminate the master-key
of the KGC and compute the full private key of the target user
by the equation S′A = (x
′
AQA + DA) = ((r
′ − s)QA + DA) =
r′QA. Therefore, the adversary with private key S′A is easy to
forge a valid certificateless signature according to signature step
of the original scheme.
We also show Yap et al.’s scheme is insecure by the usual
public key replacement attack. Our attack method is as follows:
The adversary firstly chooses a random r ∈ ZZ∗q , then he/she
replaces target user’s public key as PA = rP − P0. Secondly,
he/she randomly selects U ∈ G1, computes QA = H1(IDA) ∈
G1 and h = H2(m||U) ∈ ZZ∗q . Finally, he/she computes V =
r(U + hQA). Then the tuple (U, V ) is a valid certificateless
signature scheme. We can see that verification will pass because
the following verification equation holds
e(P0 + PA, U + hQA) = e(rP, U + hQA)
= e(P, r(U + hQA))
= e(P, V ).
V. A NEW AND EFFICIENT CERTIFICATELESS
SIGNATURE SCHEME
In this secion, we present an efficient certificateless signature
scheme. The scheme is as follows:
1. Setup: Given a security parameter k, the algorithm works
as follows:
(a) Let (G1,G2) be groups with prime order q. e denotes the
bilinear pairing G1 ×G1 → G2.
(b) Choose an arbitrary generator of P ∈ G1.
(c) Select a random s ∈ ZZ∗q and set Ppub = sP .
(d) Choose a cryptographic hash function H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
G1, H2 : {0, 1}∗×G1×G1 → G1, H3 : {0, 1}∗×G1×
G1 → ZZ∗q .
The system parameters are params =< G1,G2, e, q, P,
Ppub, H1, H2, H3 >. The message space is M = {0, 1}∗.
The master-key is s ∈ ZZ∗q .
2. Set-Partial-Private-Key : Given params and master-
key, this algorithm works as follows: Compute QA =
H1(IDA) ∈ G1 and output a partial private key DA =
sQA ∈ G1.
3. Set-Secret-Key: Given params, select a random value
xA ∈ ZZ∗q , where xA is the secret value.
4. Set-Private-Key: Given params, the partial private key
DA, the secret value xA and outputs full private key SA =
(DA, xA).
5. Set-Public-Key: Given params and the secret value xA,
this algorithm computes PA = xAP ∈ G1.
6. Sign: Given params, IDA, message m and private key SA,
the algorithm works as follows:
(a) Compute QA = H1(IDA) ∈ G1.
(b) Select a random value r ∈ ZZ∗q , compute U = rQA ∈
G1.
(c) Compute
W = H2(m||U ||PA) ∈ G1, h = H3(m||U ||PA) ∈ ZZ∗q .
(d) Compute V = xAW + (r + h)DA.
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(e) Set σ = (U, V ) as the signature of m.
7. Verify: Given signature σ, IDA,m, PA, this algorithm
works as follows:
(a) Compute QA = H1(IDA) ∈ G1.
(b) Compute
W = H2(m||U ||PA) ∈ G1, h = H3(m||U ||PA) ∈ ZZ∗q .
(c) Check whether the following verification equation
e(P, V ) = e(PA,W ) e(Ppub, U + hQA) holds. If not,
then reject the signature else accept it.
The correctness of our scheme follows from the fact that
DA = sQA ∈ G1 and
e(P, V ) = e(P, xAW + (r + h)DA)
= e(P, xAW )e(P, (r + h)DA)
= e(PA,W )e(P, s(r + h)QA)
= e(PA,W )e(Ppub, U + hQA).
In a CLS, Setup and Set-Partial-Private-Key are performed
by a KGC. A partial private key DA is given to a user A by the
KGC through a secure channel.
VI. SECURITY PROOF
Theorem 1: For the AI adversary, the proposed certificate-
less signature scheme is existentially unforgeable against adap-
tive chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model under
the assumption that the CDH problem in G1 is intractable.
Proof: Let AI be a Type I adversary who can break the
proposed scheme under adaptive chosen-message attacks. We
show how AI can be used by a probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) algorithm B to solve the CDH problem in G1. It is inter-
esting to note that the reductionist proof can be obtained without
the requirement that AI should have submitted the secret in-
formation sID corresponding to the replaced public-key PKID
when querying the signing oracle. Let (X = aP, Y = bP ) ∈
G1 × G1 be a random instance of the CDH problem taken as
input by B. The algorithm B initializes AI with Ppub = X ,
and then starts performing oracle simulation. Without loss of
generality, we assume that, for any key extraction query or sig-
nature query involving an identity, an H1(·) oracle query has
previously been made on that identity. And B maintains a
list L = (ID,DID, PKID, sID) while AI is making queries
throughout the game. B responds to AI ’s oracle queries as fol-
lows.
Queries on Oracle H1: B maintains a list L1 = (ID, t1, T ),
where T ∈ {0, 1, . . . , qH1}, qH1 is the most times for H1
query.
• If an identity ID has appeared on list L1 = (ID, t1, T ),
then B responds with H1(ID) according to T value.
• If an identity ID has not appeared on the list and ID is the
Ith distinct H1 query made by AI , then B picks t1 ∈ ZZ∗q at
random and returns H1(ID) = t1Y ∈ G1. Otherwise the
hash value H1(ID) is defined as t1P ∈ G1. In both cases,
B inserts a tuple (ID, t1, T ) in a list L1 = (ID, t1, T ) to
keep track the way it answered the queries.
Partial Private Key Queries: Suppose the request is on an
identity ID. B recovers the corresponding (ID, t1, T ) from the
list L1 (recall that such a tuple must exist because of the afore-
mentioned assumption). If T = I , then B outputs “failure” and
halts because it is unable to coherently answer the query. Other-
wise, B looks up the list L and performs as follows.
• If the list L contains (ID,DID, PKID, sID), B checks
whether DID =⊥. If DID =⊥, B returns DID to AI . If
DID =⊥, B recovers the corresponding (ID, t1, T ) from
the list L1. Noting T = I means that H1(ID) was previ-
ously defined to be t1P ∈ G1 and DID = t1Ppub = t1X ∈
G1 is the partial private key associated to ID. Thus B re-
turns DID to AI and writes DID in the list L.
• If the list L does not contain (ID,DID, PKID, sID), B
recovers the corresponding (ID, t1, T ) from the list L1,
sets DID = t1Ppub = t1X ∈ G1 and returns DID to
AI . B also sets PKID = sID =⊥ and adds an element
(ID,DID, PKID, sID) to the list L.
Public Key Queries: Suppose the query is made on an identity
ID.
• If the list L contains (ID,DID, PKID, sID), B checks
whether PKID = ⊥. If PKID =⊥, B returns PKID
to AI . Otherwise, B randomly chooses w ∈ ZZ∗q and sets
PKID = wP and sID = w. B returns PKID to AI and
saves (PKID, sID) into the list L.
• If the list L does not contain (ID,DID, PKID, sID), B
sets DID =⊥, and then randomly chooses w ∈ ZZ∗q and sets
PKID = wP and sID = w. B returns PKID to AI and
adds (ID,DID, PKID, sID) into the list L.
Private Key Extraction Queries: Suppose the query is made
on an identity ID. B recovers the corresponding (ID, t1, T )
from the list L1. If T = I , then B outputs “failure” and halts
because it is unable to coherently answer the query. Otherwise,
B looks up the list L and performs as follows.
• If the list L contains (ID,DID, PKID, sID), B checks
whether DID =⊥ and PKID =⊥. If DID =⊥, B makes a
partial private key query itself to obtain DID. If PKID =⊥,
B makes a public key query itself to generate (PKID =
wP, sID = w). Then B saves these values in the list L and
returns SKID = (DID, w) to AI .
• If the list L does not contain an item (ID,DID, PKID, sID),
B makes a partial private key query and a public key query on
ID itself, and then adds (ID,DID, PKID, sID) to the list L
and returns SKID = (DID, sID).
Public Key Replacement Queries: Suppose AI makes the
query with an input (ID, PK ′ID).
• If the list L contains an element (ID,DID, PKID, sID), B
sets PKID = PK ′ID and sID =⊥.
• If the list L does not contain an element (ID,DID, PKID,
sID), B sets DID =⊥, PKID = PK ′ID, sID =⊥, and
adds an item (ID,DID, PKID, sID) to L.
Queries on Oracle H2: Suppose (m,U, PKID) is submitted to
oracle H2(·). B first scans a list L2 = (m,U, PKID, H2, h2) to
check whether H2 has already been defined for that input. If so,
the previously defined value is returned. Otherwise, B picks at
random h2 ∈ ZZ∗q , and returns H2 = h2P ∈ G1 as a hash value
of H2(m,U, PKID) to AI , and also stores the values in the list
L2.
Queries on Oracle H3: Suppose (m,U, PKID) is submitted
to oracle H3(·). B first scans a list L3 = (m,U, PKID, h3) to
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check whether H3 has already been defined for that input. If
so, the previously defined value is returned. Otherwise, B picks
at random h3 ∈ ZZ∗q as a hash value of H3(m,U, PKID) and
returns it to AI , and also stores the values in the list L3.
Signing Oracle Queries: Suppose that AI queries the oracle
with an input (m, ID). Without loss of generality, we assume
that the list L contains an item (ID,DID, PKID, sID), and
PKID =⊥. (If the list L does not contain such an item, or
if PKID =⊥, B runs a public key query to get (PKID, sID).)
Note that at any time during the simulation, equipped the item
(ID,DID, PKID, sID) for any T = I and sID =⊥, B is easy
to generate signature on any message.
For the circumstance T = I or sID =⊥, B firstly picks
at random two numbers r, h3 ∈ ZZ∗q , sets U = rP − h3QID
and defines the hash value of H3(m,U, PKID) as h3 (B halts
and outputs “failure” if H3(m,U, PKID) turns out to have al-
ready been defined for (m, ID, PKID, U)). Then B looks up
the list L2 for (m,U, PKID, H2, h2) such that the hash value
of H2(m,U, PKID) has been defined to H2 = h2P (If such
an item does not exist, B makes a query on oracle H2). Finally,
B sets V = h2PKID + rPpub. Now (U, V ) is returned to AI ,
which appears to be a valid signature since
e(PKID, H2(m||U ||PKID))×
e(Ppub, U + H3(m||U ||PKID)QID)
= e(PKID, h2P )e(Ppub, rP − h3QID + h3QID)
= e(P, h2PKID)e(P, rPpub)
= e(P, h2PKID + rPpub)
= e(P, V ).
Note that, the above simulation for signing queries works
even in the strong case that B does not know the secret value
sID corresponding to the public key PKID of a user with iden-
tity ID.
Forgery: The next step of the simulation is to apply the forking
technique formalized in [14]. Let (m, (U, V ), IDI , PKIDI ) be
a forgery output by AI at the end of the attack. If AI does not
output ID = IDI as a part of the forgery then B aborts (the
probability that B does not abort the simulation is O(1/qH1)).
B then replays AI with the same random tape, but the different
choice of the hash function H3 and the same choice of the hash
function H2 to get another forgery (m, (U, V ′), IDI , PKIDI ).
Notice that the hash values h3 = h′3 on (m,U, PKIDI ) for the
two choices of H3. From the forking lemma, after a polyno-
mial reply of the AI adversary, we obtain two valid signatures
(m, (U, V ), IDI , PKIDI ) and (m, (U, V ′), IDI , PKIDI ) with
h3 = h′3. Then we have the following equalities,
e(P, V ) = e(PKIDI , H2)e(Ppub, U + h3QI),
e(P, V ′) = e(PKIDI , H2)e(Ppub, U + h
′
3QI),
from which we obtain
e(P, V −V ′) = e(Ppub, (h3−h′3)QI) = e(aP, (h3−h′3)t1bP ),
i.e., V − V ′ = (h3 − h′3)t1abP . Thus, it is not difficult to see
that abP = (h3−h′3)−1t−11 (V −V ′). This completes our proof.
Theorem 2: If a PPT forger AII has an advantage ε in forg-
ing a signature in an attack modeled by Game II after running
in time t and making at most qHi queries to random oracles
Hi for i = 2, 3, at most qE queries to the private-key extrac-
tion oracle, at most qPK queries to the public-key request ora-
cle, at most qS queries to the signing oracle, and e is the base
of the natural logarithm, then the CDH problem can be solved
with probability ε′  1eqE (1 − (qSqH2 − 2)/2k)ε, within time
t′ < t+(qH2 +qPK +3qS)tm, where tm is the time to compute
a scalar multiplication in G1.
Proof: Suppose AII is a Type II adversary that (t, ε)-
breaks our certificateless signature scheme. We show how to
construct a t′-time algorithm B that solves the CDH problem
on G1 with probability at least ε′. Let (X = aP, Y = bP ∈
G1 × G1) be a random instance of the CDH problem taken as
input by B. B randomly chooses s ∈ ZZ∗q as the master key, and
then initializes AII with Ppub = sP and also the master key
s. The adversary AII then starts making oracle queries such
as those described in Game II. Note that the partial private key
DID = sH1(ID) can be computed by both B andAII , thus the
hash function H1(·) is not modeled as a random oracle in this
case. B maintains a list L = {(ID, PKID, sID, T )}, which
does not need to be made in advance and is populated whenAII
makes certain queries specified below.
Queries on Oracle H2: Suppose a tuple (m,U, PKID) is sub-
mitted to oracle H2(·). B first scans a list L2 = {(m,U, PKID,
H2, h2)} to check whether H2 has already been defined for that
input. If so, the previously defined value is returned. Other-
wise, B selects at random h2 ∈ ZZ∗q and defines the value of
H2(m,U, PKID) as H2 = h2Y ∈ G1. B adds the tuple
(m,U, PKID, H2, h2) into the list L2 and responds to AII by
seting H2(m,U, PKID) = H2.
Queries on Oracle H3: When a tuple (m,U, PKID) is submit-
ted to oracle H3(·). B first scans a list L3 = {(m,U, PKID,
h3)} to check whether H3 has already been defined for that in-
put. If so, the existing value is returned. Otherwise, B picks
at random h3 ∈ ZZ∗q as a hash value of H3(m,U, PKID) and
returns it to AII , and also stores the values in the list L3.
Public Key Queries: Suppose the query is made on an identity
ID.
• If the list L contains (ID, PKID, sID, T ),B returns PKID
to AII .
• If the list L does not contain (ID, PKID, sID, T ), B picks
a number w ∈ ZZ∗q at random. B flips a coin T ∈ {0, 1} that
yields 0 with probability δ and 1 with probability 1 − δ. If
T = 0, the value of PKID is defined as wP ∈ G1. If T =
1, the value of PKID is defined as wX ∈ G1. In both cases,
B sets sID = w, and inserts a tuple (ID, PKID, sID, T )
into a list L = {(ID, PKID, sID, T )} to keep track the
way it answered the queries. B returns PKID to AII .
Private Key Extraction Queries: Suppose the query is made
on an identity ID.
• If the list L contains (ID, PKID, sID, T ), B returns
SKID = (DID, sID) to AII if T = 0, and fails otherwise.
• If the list L does not contain (ID, PKID, sID, T ), B
makes a public key query on ID itself, and adds
(ID, PKID, sID, T ) into the list L. Then B returns
SKID = (DID, sID) to AII if T = 0, and fails otherwise.
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Signing Oracle Queries: SupposeAII makes the query with an
input (m, ID, PKID). Without loss of generality, we assume
that there is an item (ID, PKID, sID, T ) in the list L.
• If T = 0, due to knowing SKID = (DID, sID), B is easy
to generate signature on any message.
• If T = 1, B firstly chooses at random h2 ∈ ZZ∗q , U ∈ G1
and defines the hash value of H2(m,U, PKID) as h2P (B
halts and outputs “failure” if H2(m,U, PKID) turns out to
have already been defined for (m, ID, PKID, U)). Then B
looks up the list L3 for (m,U, PKID, h3) such that the hash
value of H3(m,U, PKID) has been defined to H3 = h3 (If
such an item does not exist, B makes a query on oracle H3).
Finally, B sets V = h2PKID + sU +h3DID. Now (U, V )
is returned to AII , which appears to be a valid signature
since
e(P, V ) = e(P, h2PKID + sU + h3DID)
= e(P, h2PKID) · e(P, sU + sh3QID)
= e(PKID, H2(m||U ||PKID))
× e(Ppub, U + H3(m||U ||PKID)QID).
Output: Eventually AII outputs a spurious signature σ∗ =
(U∗, V ∗) on a message M∗ corresponding to a target identity
ID∗ and a public key PKID∗ such that ID∗ has not been issued
as a private key query. Moreover, M∗ should not be queried to
the signing oracle with respect to ID∗ and PKID∗ . Then B
recovers (ID∗, PKID∗ , sID∗ , T ∗) from L and evaluates T ∗. If
T ∗ = 0, then B outputs failure and stops. Otherwise, it looks up
an item (m∗, U∗, PKID∗ , H∗2 , h∗2) in the list L2 such that the
value of H2(m∗, U∗, PKID∗) has been defined as h∗2Y ∈ G1.
Then B looks up an item (m∗, U∗, PKID∗ , h∗3) in the list L3
such that the value of H3(m∗, U∗, PKID∗) has been defined to
be h∗3. Note that the lists L2 and L3 must contain such entries
with overwhelming probability. If AII succeeds in the game,
then the following equation is satisfied:
e(P, V ∗) = e(PKID∗ , H2(m∗||U∗||PKID∗))
× e(Ppub, U∗ + H3(m∗||U∗||PKID∗)QID∗)
= e(sID∗X,h∗2Y )e(sP, U
∗ + h∗3QID∗)
= e(P, sID∗h∗2abP )e(P, sU
∗ + h∗3DID∗).
Therefore, e(P, V ∗ − sU∗ − h∗3DID∗) = e(P, sID∗h∗2abP ).
Due to knowing s, h∗3, h∗2, sID∗ ∈ ZZ∗q , abP = (sID∗h∗2)−1(V ∗
− sU∗ − h∗3DID∗) is the solution to the CDH instance (X,Y ).
This completes the description of B. It remains to show that
B solves the given instance of the CDH problem in G1 with
probability at least ε′. To do so, we analyze the following three
events needed for B to succeed:
• ξ1: B does not abort as a result of any of AII ’s private key
extraction queries and signature queries.
• ξ2: AII generates a valid message-signature forgery
(ID∗,M∗, σ∗).
• ξ3: Event ξ2 and T ∗ = 1 for the tuple containing M∗ on the
list L.
B succeeds if all of these events happen. The probabil-
ity Pr[ξ1 ∧ ξ2 ∧ ξ3] decomposes as Pr[ξ1 ∧ ξ2 ∧ ξ3] =
Pr[ξ1]Pr[ξ2|ξ1]Pr[ξ3|ξ1 ∧ ξ2]. The following claims give a
lower bound for each of these terms.
Claim 1. B does not abort as a result of any of AII ’s private
key extraction queries and signature queries is at least δqE (1 −
(qSqH2 − 2)/2k), hence
Pr[ξ1]  δqE (1− (qSqH2 − 2)/2k).
Proof: The probability thatB answers to all private key ex-
traction queries is at least δqE . Next we compute the probability
that B answers to all signature queries. Our simulation for ora-
cle H3 is perfect. Due to a conflict on H2, the probability that B
fails to handle a signature query is at most qSqH2/2k. The prob-
ability forAII to output a valid forgery σ∗ on a message M∗ for
identity ID∗ with public key PK∗ID, without asking the corre-
sponding H2(m∗||U∗||PKID∗) query or H3(m∗||U∗||PKID∗)
query, is at most 2/2k. Therefore, the probability that B answers
to all signature queries is 1− (qSqH2 − 2)/2k. Thus, B does not
abort as a result of any of AII ’s private key extraction queries
and signature queries is δqE (1− (qSqH2 − 2)/2k). 
Claim 2. IfB does not abort as a result of any ofAII ’s private
key extraction queries and signature queries then AII ’s view is
identical to its view in the real attack. Hence, Pr[ξ2|ξ1]  ε.
Claim 3. The probability that B does not abort after AII
outputs a valid forgery is at least 1− δ. Hence, Pr[ξ3|ξ1∧ξ2] 
1− δ.
The proofs of the claim 2 and claim 3 are similar with
literature [15], the interested reader is referred to it. From
above claims, we obtain Pr[ξ1 ∧ ξ2 ∧ ξ3]  δqE (1 − δ)(1 −
(qSqH2 − 2)/2k)ε. And, by an analysis similar in [16], we
can see that the maximal value of the probability δqE (1 − δ)
is 1qE (1 − 1qE+1 )qE+1  1eqE (for sufficiently larger qE) when
the δ = 1− 1/(qE + 1) is taken. Thus,
Pr[ξ1 ∧ ξ2 ∧ ξ3]  1
eqE
(1− (qSqH2 − 2)/2k)ε.
This completes our proof. 
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reviewed the security of the efficient certifi-
cateless signature scheme proposed in [9]. we show that their
scheme does not resist against public key replacement attacks,
and gives the main cause suffered from attack. Furthermore, we
proposed an improved certificateless signature scheme, which is
existential unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks
in the random oracle model and proves the security of the pro-
posed scheme in Zhang’s [3] security model.
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